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Abstract. The debate between natural law and positivist law has been received much 
attention. Ronald Dworkin exposes the limitation of positivist law through the argument of 
hard cases. This argument is furthered strengthened when we apply the interpretation of 
Martin Luther King Jr and the voluntarist natural law tradition, and Lon Fuller’s ‘procedural 
view’ and the application of the ‘principles of legality’. 
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1. Introduction 
n this paper I will argue for the position that the proper way to decide 
‘hard cases’ is through the application of the natural law approach. This 
is primarily because natural law theory, considers ‚moral evaluations‛ 
as a necessary part of determining the content of the legal system. This 
approach is distinguished from the legal positivism approach, which in 
brief insists on a separation of law and morality. Therefore, to support my 
argument I will employ the interpretation of three prominent natural law 
theorists, Martin Luther King Jr, Lon Fuller and Dworkin.  
According to Dworkin, a hard case occurs when, ‚no such established 
rule can be found‛ (Bix, 2004: 86). Dworkin gives us two examples of hard-
cases and these are the cases of Rigs V Palmer and Henningsen V Bloomfield. 
In Riggs, the issue that arises is if an heir should inherit the will of his 
grandfather even though he is guilty of murdering his grandfather. In this 
case, there is no established rule that states that the heir should or should 
not receive inheritance because he is guilty. In Henningsen the appeal was 
to set a higher standard of liability for the automobile company. In this case 
again there was no prior established rule that that set a higher standard of 
liability in the case accidents occurring from defective parts. More 
examples of hard-cases can be found in the era of Martin Luther King Jr, 
when he was imprisoned in Birmingham. King writes his Letter from 
Birmingham Jail acutely aware of the injustice prevalent because of the 
segregationist laws. There were a few if any rules established for cases that 
resulted from racial discrimination. 
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Even though there are divisions in natural law philosophy, the central 
theme present is that, ‚moral evaluation is considered central or necessary 
to either determining the content of legal rules, evaluating legal status of 
particular rules or systems, or the analysis of the nature of law.‛ (Bix, 2004: 
99).  Hence a judge who ascribes to a natural law view of legal philosophy, 
would consider the moral evaluations of law to be of utmost importance 
when deciding ‘hard cases’ where new rules need to be formulated. King, 
Fuller and Dworkin, through their interpretations provide further insights 
as to how a judge may reason about rule formulation when deciding on 
hard-cases, while adhering to natural law philosophy.  The natural law 
view that King appeals to in his Letter from Birmingham Jail, can be 
described as a form of voluntarist traditional natural law. It is divine 
commands that create moral values and hence, ‚a just law is a man-made 
code that squares with the moral law, or the law of God. An unjust law is a 
code that is out of harmony with the moral law.‛ (King, 1963: 3).  
King looks at the ‘content’ of law prevalent in his time and compares 
them to the ideals set by his traditional predecessors such as St. Thomas 
Aquinas and St. Augustine and hence, ‚an unjust law is a human law that 
is out of harmony with natural law.‛ (King, 1963: 3). Furthermore, for King 
the effect that a law has on a human’s personality is of importance and 
hence a just law uplifts human personality and an unjust law does not. 
King further provides an example where the unjust law is an infliction on 
the minority imposed by a majority, forcing them instead of compelling 
them. Therefore, an unjust law is not binding although a just law has a 
binding force to it.  
A judge that employees the natural law philosophy can choose to work 
within the tradition of his predecessors. While staying true to traditional 
natural law philosophy, Lon Fuller has provided for a much more 
sophisticated position. Lon Fuller treats law as a process or function, rather 
than any other object of study of science. For Fuller, the law is not a ‘one-
way projection of authority’ (Bix, 2004: 77), rather Fuller makes the claim 
that it is better understood as, ‘involving reciprocity between officials and 
citizens’ (Bix, 2004: 77). Furthermore, for Fuller the ‘moral ideals’ towards 
which we strive is what makes law a process. He contrasts law with 
managerial direction, ‚which is attuned to attaining the objectives of the 
‘rule maker’ – as contrasted with law, whose purpose is primarily helping 
citizens to coexist, cooperate and thrive‛ (Bix, 2004: 77). Therefore, for 
Fuller, establishing a new rule of law in ‘hard-cases’ would not be merely 
assigning it characteristics, but ‚an official response to certain kinds of 
problems- in particular, the guidance and coordination of citizens’ action in 
society.‛ (Bix, 2004: 78). 
Fuller further provides, guidance to natural law philosophers by 
developing his ‘procedural’ view and offering a list of principles which he 
terms, ‘principles of legality’. In Fuller’s view these principles serve as the 
criteria to test the ‘minimal duties’ of the government and they also set out 
to define the direction of excellence to which the government should strive 
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for. Therefore, they provide judges with an invaluable framework to assess 
the effect of a new rule when hard-cases arise. Fuller’s principles make it 
easier for law-makers to promulgate new rules and hence aid in guiding 
the behavior of citizens. A popular objection to Fuller is that, even though 
his principles maybe adopted, the theory proposes an efficient judicial 
system and not necessarily a moral judicial system. Although this criticism 
is diminished significantly while employing Dworkin’s argument and the 
idea of a moral scale. 
Ronald Dworkin, who originally initiated the problem of hard-cases in, 
“Law as Integrity”, is regarded to be a proponent of an interpretative theory 
of law. Even though Dworkin’s approach is that, one should find the best 
interpretation available from the relevant data, he is regarded as a natural 
lawyer because he does not endorse a separation of morality from law and 
on the contrary, the best interpretation is one, ‚which presents the legal 
system as better morally.‛ (Bix, 2004: 84). In formulating his theory 
Dworkin, takes into consideration not only principles, but also rules and 
policies. According to Dworkin, the principles are an integral part of the 
decision-making process when hard-cases arise. His definition of a 
principle states the importance in terms of justice and fairness. Therefore, ‚I 
call a principle a standard that is to be observed, not because it will 
advance or secure an economic or political or social situation deemed 
desirable, but because it is a requirement of justice or fairness or some other 
dimension of morality‛ (Dworkin,1977:  75).  
Dworkin’s interpretation of what a principle is important for a judge 
who adopts natural law philosophy and comes across hard-cases. This is 
because by applying principles and including his best interpretation of the 
data, the judge is able to formulate a rule where one did not previously 
exist and do so by keeping true to the spirit of justice and fairness. A 
further reason why principles in addition to rules facilitate the rule-making 
process is because, unlike rules, principles are not all or nothing. Principles 
have a ‘weight and dimension’ (Dworkin, 1977: 78), and hence when a 
conflict arises, the principles weight and importance can be taken into 
account to resolve the conflict.  
What makes the cases hard to the legal positivists is that, firstly there is 
no established rule, second if there is a rule to be created by the discretion 
of a judge then, what the positivist lacks is a criterion for that rule making. 
Therefore, through Fuller’s distinction between law as a process and 
function, a new rule cannot be limited to certain characteristics and hence it 
should have a function. Therefore, for a natural law philosopher, there is a 
function to law which extends beyond merely applying characteristics to 
the rule and therefore according to Dworkin it becomes the responsibility 
of the judge to provide for the best interpretation in accordance with a 
moral scale.  
In the cases mentioned by Dworkin and the continuous fight against the 
laws of discrimination since the era of King, it is evident that natural law 
philosophy is in play. In Riggs V Palmer, there is no ruling that says that the 
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murderer should not receive his inheritance. However, the court denies the 
murderer his inheritance and cites the principle, ‚no one shall be permitted 
to profit from his own fraud‛ (Riggs, 2002: 75). Hence this decision reveals 
that the formulation of law and rules include principles and the system 
adheres to a spirit of justice and fairness. In Henningsen again the court cites 
a more specific principle, ‚the courts generally refuse to lend themselves to 
the enforcement of a ‘bargain’ in which one party is has unjustly taken 
advantage of the economic necessitates of the other (Riggs, 2002: 76). 
In conclusion, I think the proper and best way to solve hard-cases is 
through the application of the natural law approach. This is primarily 
because, the natural law approach takes into account the moral evaluations 
of the rule being written. Furthermore, the natural law approach, proposed 
by Fuller provides a moral function to a new rule and law and therefore, in 
hard cases where a rule is not evident, the new rule provides guidance for 
the citizens of the society. Furthermore, the application of principles as 
proposed by Fuller provides a framework from which to derive rules. Even 
though Dworkin, does not prefer to use the label of natural-law when 
proposing his theory, his theory stays true to the central tenant of natural 
law and that the interpretation of the available data should be the best one 
in accordance with a moral scale. As King observes the words of St. 
Augustine, an ‚unjust law is no law at all‛ (King, 1963: 3), and even though 
the strong reading of St. Augustine is rejected by many prominent jurists 
and philosophers due to its contradictory nature,  once we start to think 
that law has a teleological purpose, a purpose that extends beyond the 
mere application of characteristics to rules, we start to appreciate the words 
of St. Augustine and the value of justice and fairness. 
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